Free USCA Mandate - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

QQ87-CFD Document 32 Filed O3/O2/2006 Page 1 of4
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UNITED STATES LOURT OF APPEA . H { it . _
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT /7 ‘
SUMMARY ORDER I I ; _
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THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHEDINTH FE — L i I- •· RT R -
AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AU'l`H0'!| TY O THES { {{= 5
OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED T0 THE ATTEN to • ‘ jigs _q __v,q gi§ ‘
OTHERCOURTINASUBSEQUENTSTAGEOFTHISCASE,;I A {
IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPP :¤ O · · _ S I - T A
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{ At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for th Sec ·· d ' ir! fe d at hc .
, United States Courthouse, Foley Square, inthe City 0fNew York, S the St{ a,{;9{{;t my,{l_t { tty
Two thousand and Six. _ I , Y . -.
PRESENT; , __, E p . _ t ..
, HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, twiigl is Q ` _
{ HON. RICHARD C. WESLEY, · .-; _,{{_
Circuit Judges, i i H0 { '
_ HON. LEWIS A. KAPLAN, { » _,_.,.. li Q {
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JOSEPH INTURRI, DARREN EESSE, MARK CASTAGNA, STE E . iIEiLi{1 d { ?
MATTHEW ROONEY, · { {
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PlaintmTv~Appeil¢znts, l T ;
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CITY OF HARTFORD mid BRUCE P. MARQUIS, Q I i
Defendants-Appellees. I {Z -
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APPEARING POR PLAINTIFPS-APPELLANTS: JON L.- H N O L. {_ _
Schoculi m · oe otd,
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· The Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan, United States District Jud g, fo e- . is . .
` Of New York, sitting by designation. ‘ Q _ _ l . .
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I ,;_ _,. (Lane 3;Q3—cveOO987-QED Document 32 Filed O3/O2/2006. I°age 2 of 4
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APPEARING FOR DEFENDANTS—APPELLIEES: HELENI .· PO * · ss st It Z; *
Corporat nC es l, f I
Hartford, art dg ¤IniIe i t.
I UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, AI II· JU • 1 E ,
I DECREED that the judgment of the United States District Court for 11 e D s `e 0I' Qc = tie ·
(Droney, J.) is AFFIRMED, I .
Plaintiffs-appellants Joseph Inturri, Darren Besse, Mark 3 a, » epI e1I ie e It
Matthew Rooney ("plaintiffs") appeal from a March 30, 2005 judgm to t e j o I
dismissing all claims against the City of Hartford and its former Chi of ' • ici , EI ii e P. I
Marquis (collectively, the "City" or "defe11dants"). See Imfurri v. Ci I of ·• rf rczll F. Sup . I
2d 240 (D. Conn. 2005). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the acts •¤ _ - dasIe, h I j
relevant procedural background, and the issues on appeal. ;
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The plaintiffs raised various constitutional challenges under ’ U. " . . lI)&I5 t art In d 1
I Police Department General Order 6-15, which gives the police chief the . o • d r E I I
I personnel to cover tattoos that are deemed as offensive and/or preseir ng ... uri r Ifeissi n l I I
appearance? They also challenged the chiefs April 14, 2003 memo = d Ot ·· I0 I
cover the spider-web tattoos on their elbows while on duty, which fe owe e c di ·
that those tattoos were known to some people as a symbol of racist v len I e he _
district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, eonstruing the e iden = in thI: ; ost I
favorable to the 11o11—moving party. Famer v. Prudential Ins. C0. of ., 3 I t Fl. dI1g 0 , 208 2d Q I
cir. 2002). I il I I
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I. First Amendment Overbreadth 1 I ‘
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Plaintiffs claim that the General Order violates the First Ame dm bg aIis§ i is
unconstitutionally overbroad. We allow a party to bring an overbreai th c · l gd e e t I
“satisf1es the [Article III] requirement of ‘injury—in—fact,’ and [where it c e · » ff te I I
satisfactorily to frame the issues in the case." Secjv of Md. v. Joseph . · ¤· · · 6 U. ‘I {
947, 958 (1984). Plaintiffs have waived any claim that the General I rder r u al l • .1tedI I
their First Amendment rights by asserting that their tattoos are not I ress e. I ls `nto I `
question whether it would be appropriate for this Court to entertain t eir 0 · b e . c . len ,
because it is not altogether clear that they meet the threshold requir -.¤ ents r .=dth I _
challenge as articulated in Munson. We need not resolve this questi h ~ h . · aus I it I
is clear that plai11tiffs’ overbreadth challenge is without merit. =
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General Order 6-15 affects only tattoos displayed by on—duty I olic .· • I ·e F st
Amendment rights of public employees are signihcantly more limit th ci e =· .Il I
public. "[A] governmental employer may subject its employees to I h s ia reIstiIic '0 s o
_ free expression as are reasonably necessary to promote effective gov rnm ." FDPIIH . · lin- , _
= 444 U.S. 348, 356 11.13 (1980). A police department has a reasonabl int stf o e I
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I i‘tiv-00987-CFD Qocumyent 32 Filed 03/ • 2/2 6_ IPrI1g - of I
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I or appearing unprofessional before, the public it serves. See Kelley v Joh s ne · 2I5 'I 38, I I
I 247 (1976). Therefore, few if any ofthe tattoos covered by General llrder • 15 wiuild I II all I= I I
be protected by the First Amendment. There is thus no "realistic dan er I sIatI,1t it elf ill I
I significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections o part'- . ng t l:Iefpr t e I I
Court," City Council v. Taxpayers for Wncent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (l ' 4), I I t e pliIin if s’ I I
overbreadth challenge accordingly fails. 7 § I I
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II. Vagueness I
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I Plaintiffs also claim that the General Order is so vague as to _ olat II ei t ue .
I process. Laws with merely civil consequences receive less exacting: ague ss ;Iut’n an I
criminal laws, see Hoffman Estates v. Flmstde, Hojjfman Estates, 45 U.S. · 89, 498IIl 'I I ), · II
in the public employment context we have held that a specific notice II I m It I · t Y
behavior falls within the scope of a regulation can provide adequate tice e Jtlnfits itr v.
Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep ’t, 607 F.2d 17, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). H e, II I pl inItiffs e ive a
memorandum specifically telling them their tattoos must be covered. he ei f`oIre§ Ire ei ed I
ample notice of the regulation’s applicability to their case. Furtherm II re, g en ic
employment context, the order conferred no improper discretion on t e po I e •I S e ity {
Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57 (1999) (plurality opinion of Stel ns, I . I IZ
Plaintiffs also seek to challenge the General Order on its face A f- 'al ah1.II:rI ss I
challenge is permissible where a law "affect[s] communication prote ted I ui I I
Amendment," and the regulation’s deterrent effect on "legitimate ex I essi " i I rIalI I d `
substantial. Young v. Ain. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (197 . H , a defied b ve, Ig e I ‘
General Order implicates expressive conduct, but does not affect an. igni =I II II f ·
conduct that would actually be protected by the First Amendment. us, • fa ial II ess II I
challenge is permissible. I I I Q
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III. Equal Protection I I; I
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Plaintiffs claim that the chiefs memorandum ordering them. il co · th irItaIto s iolII ed I
their right to equal protection. Plaintiffs argue that we should apply leigh e scruti i I th r {
case because the order affected their fundamental liberty interest in ` eir p so al Iappe I ce. I
See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 2003) (dis ussi ;_ in erI·nI:Idi t I
scrutiny). ln Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. $ 03) BI el; I i the I
context of public employment there is no fimdamental liberty interes I in p of 1 I= = ce. I d. f
at 321. We thus apply rational basis scrutiny, and have no difficulty *I de I` ti ·-I
rational for the police chief to require police officers to cover a tatto whi ce ~ II bly
have been perceived as a racist symbol. I
Plaintiffs also argue that the chiefs memorandum constitute a sel · tiv pIrcise ut on d _
thus violates their right to equal protection. But plaintiffs have not s I own at =I e I eat d _`
differently from similarly situated officers, because no other officers ere 0 ·· e tatt s
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l `%· ··—€“ase 3:03-cv-00987-CFD Qocuntent 32 Filed 03/ 2/2 06 fag 4 of 4 _
p that could be interpreted as racist. Even if the plaintiffs were treated iffer ··tl` iti was · 0 to C
t inhibit their exercise of First Amendment rights, because as noted abi c, t ¤ pl initiflfs no [
First Amendment right to display their tattoos. Their selective prose tio • ai · there i r fai Q; .2
See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F .3d 89, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that selec ve p • · • t o c rs li
I where plaintiff shows differential treatment based on an impermissib · co d i · t`o1*§i s c as lz i
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional r`hts). — |_
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IV. Conclusion { I E
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court i here l ·- . §
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