Free Order on Motion for Summary Judgment - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

Case 3:03-cv-00620-DFM

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT EFRAIN HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. JOHN ARMSTRONG, ET AL., Defendants. : : : : : : : : :

CASE NO. 3:03CV620(DFM)

RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The plaintiff, Efrain Hernandez, a Connecticut inmate, brings this civil rights action pro se against the former Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Correction John Armstrong and

correctional officers Carnes, Rochefort and Talo.1

The plaintiff

alleges that procedures employed at a disciplinary hearing were constitutionally invalid and that the hearing officer and prison officials violated his constitutional right to procedural due process. Pending before the court are the parties' cross-motions For the reasons that follow, the court

for summary judgment.2

denies the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (doc. #26) and grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. #34.)

The record does not contain these defendants' first names. The defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the parties consented to have a magistrate judge conduct any or all further proceedings in the case, including trial and entry of a final judgment (Doc. #27.) Chief Judge Chatigny referred to the case to the undersigned. (Doc. #28.)
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I.

Factual Background3 On July 30, 1995, while incarcerated at the Corrigan

Correctional Institution, the plaintiff was in an altercation involving a knife. The institution charged him with assault. (Pl's Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ¶1 [admitted].) Lieutenant Pompi,

not a party to this action, wrote a disciplinary report regarding the incident. the report (Answer ¶1.) that The defendant Talo signed the area on the disciplinary report had been

indicating

delivered to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, however, contends that Immediately after the incident, the On August 10, 1995, while in

he was not given this report.

plaintiff was placed in segregation.

segregation, he was given a disciplinary report for the July 30, 1995 incident. The defendant Carnes signed this report.

On August 10, 1995, a disciplinary hearing regarding the July 30, 1995 incident was held at which the defendant Rochefort was the disciplinary hearing officer. The plaintiff pled guilty to the (Answer ¶4.) He and defendant

charge in the disciplinary report. Rochefort signed the report. ¶7 [admitted].)

(Pl's Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement

The plaintiff received as sanctions thirty days

confinement in punitive segregation, loss of one hundred fifty days of good time4 and loss of fifteen days of recreation. (Compl. at

3

The facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

"Good time credit is a creation of legislative grace." Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, 94 Conn. App. 210, 2006 WL 559389, at *1 (Mar. 14, 2006). "The Commissioner by statute has 2

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6.)5

Subsequently, he was charged with state criminal charges of

assault in the second and third degrees and possession of a weapon in a correctional institution. (Pl's ex. E.) The plaintiff pled

guilty to these charges pursuant to the Alford doctrine6 and received a four year sentence to be served consecutive to his underlying sentence. (Pl's ex. E.) The plaintiff is challenging (Pl's ex. K.)

his criminal conviction in state court.

After completing his time in segregation, the plaintiff was transferred to a different correctional facility, Northern

Correctional Institution. [admitted].)

(Pl's Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ¶8

In April 1996, he filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in Connecticut Superior Court claiming due process violations occurred in the August 10, 1995 disciplinary hearing. (Def's ex. 6.) In response, a new disciplinary hearing on the (Def's ex. 5.) At the new hearing

institutional charges was held.

on January 9, 2003, the hearing officer dismissed the institutional charge of assault because of procedural anomalies at the August 10, 1995 hearing. were restored. (Pl's ex. D.) (Compl. at 8.) The plaintiff's good time credits The bases for the hearing officer's

discretion whether to award so-called statutory good time . . . ." Harris v. Meulemans, 389 F. Supp. 2d 438, 442 (D. Conn. 2005). See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-7a. The citation is to the page of the complaint as the complaint does not contain separate, numbered averments. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
6 5

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 3

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decision to dismiss the charge were: "contradictory documents, no record of hearing, no record of investigation, time since incident and witnesses unavailable." (Def's ex. 6.) As a result of the

rehearing, the state court dismissed as moot the plaintiff's habeas action in February 2003. (Def's ex. 7.)

Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning alleged procedural due process violations that occurred in the August 10, 1995 hearing. He claims, inter

alia, that in violation of Department of Correction Administrative Directives he did not receive a copy of the original disciplinary report, was not given adequate time to prepare his defense, was not provided the opportunity to consult with an investigator or an advocate, and that defendant Rochefort "cut him off" and did not permit him to explain the incident or listen to his complaints about the process.7 II. Legal Standard In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving

In his opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appears to allege that the defendants are responsible for his subsequent placement in administrative segregation upon his transfer to Northern Correctional Institution ("Northern"). (Doc. #38 at 5.) The court does not address this claim because his allegation regarding the conditions of his confinement at Northern is not plead in the complaint and did not enter the case until the plaintiff mentioned it in his opposition memoranda. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998) (a party may not amend its complaint through statements made in motion papers); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 914 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1980)(a party is not entitled to amend its complaint through statements made in motion papers). 4

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party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 A dispute regarding a material fact is

U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 477 U.S. at 248. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

When the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court is

obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations. See Weinstein v. Albright, 261

F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2001). Although a pro se plaintiff is entitled to special latitude, he must establish more than merely "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Where, as here, "both parties move for summary judgment, asserting the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, a court need not enter judgment for either party. . . . Rather, each party's motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration." Morales v. Quintel Entertainment,

Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). III. Discussion The plaintiff contends that he was denied procedural due process during the course of a disciplinary hearing which resulted in a penalty of thirty days in segregation, loss of fifteen days

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recreation and loss of one hundred fifty days good time. defendants argue that the plaintiff was not deprived

The of a

constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. with the defendants. "The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

The court agrees

Clause

protects

persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake." U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). Wilkinson v. Austin, ___ The "Supreme Court has

made clear that, with respect to a prisoner serving a sentence, not every aspect of restrictive confinement within a penal institution impairs a constitutionally protected liberty interest." Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1994). Wright v.

See Sandin v. Hewitt, 515

U.S. 472, 478 (1995) ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.") To successfully state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of due process arising out of a disciplinary hearing, a plaintiff must show that he (1) possessed an actual liberty interest, and (2) was deprived of that interest without being afforded sufficient process. 280 F.3d 69, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2000). Pursuant to Sandin v. Hewitt, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the court "applies a two-part test to determine whether an inmate possesses a protected liberty interest." Bourguignon v. Lantz, No. See Tellier v. Fields,

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3:05CV245(SRU), 2006 WL 214009, at *7 (D. Conn. Jan. 25, 2006). For a liberty interest to be protectable, the plaintiff must establish both that the confinement or restraint creates an

"atypical8 and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, and that "the state has granted its inmates, by regulation or by statute, a protected liberty interest in remaining free from that confinement or restraint." (2d Cir. 1996). would be Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317

"A prisoner who satisfies both of these elements to the procedural due process protections

entitled

enunciated by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556-58, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-75, and its progeny." 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). "Although there is no bright-line rule regarding the length or type of sanction that would give rise to an 'atypical and Jackson v. Johnson, 15 F. Supp. 2d 341,

significant hardship,' this standard will not be met unless the disciplinary and administrative sanctions are onerous." Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 1999). In determining whether

prison conditions meet this standard, the court considers both the conditions and their duration. 578, 586 (2d Cir. 1999). The plaintiff was subjected to thirty days punitive See Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d

"Atypicality in a Sandin inquiry normally presents a question of law." Ciaprazi v. Goord, No. Civ. 9:02cv915, 2005 WL 3531464, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1995). 7

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segregation and lost fifteen days of recreation.

He has not

alleged facts suggesting that these sanctions were qualitatively different from ordinary prison life. Circuit indicate that keeplock or Decisions in the Second segregated housing unit

confinement of 30 days or less is not an "atypical or significant hardship" under Sandin. See Williams v. Keane, No. 95 CIV. 0379,

1997 WL 527677, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1997) (citing cases). See, e.g., Sandin v. Hewitt, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (no liberty interest protecting against a 30-day assignment to segregated confinement); Nicholson v. Murphy, No. 3:02CV1815(MRK), 2003 WL 22909876, at *10-*11 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2003) (confinement in segregation for twenty-seven days is not an atypical and

significant hardship); Rosario v. Selsky, No. 94 Civ. 6872, 1995 WL 764178, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1995) (120 days confinement in special housing unit with loss of privileges was not punishment "qualitatively different" from punishment normally suffered by one in prison). In light of the plaintiff's allegations and the

relevant case law, the court concludes that the plaintiff's thirtyday confinement in segregation and loss of recreation are not an atypical and significant hardship and do not give rise to a liberty interest under Sandin. As to the plaintiff's loss of 150 days of good time as a result of the hearing, it is true that "inmates have a liberty interest in good time credit they have already earned." Abed v.

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Armstrong, 209 F.3d 63, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2000).

However, the

plaintiff, by his own admission, concedes that his good time was restored. "[W]here appeal good or time credits state were reinstated no by

administrative

subsequent

action,

liberty

interest exists and no lawsuit can prevail.

See Laws v. Cleaver,

140 F. Supp. 2d 145, 151-155 (D. Conn. 2001); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 1994)." Roston v. Selsky, No. 00 CIV. 8994(HB),

2001 WL 1297797, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2001). The plaintiff has failed to establish the deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to trigger the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due process requirements. Accordingly, because the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of a protected liberty interest, his due process claim fails. IV. Conclusion For these reasons, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (doc. #26) is denied and the defendant's motion for summary

judgment (doc. #34) is granted.

The Clerk is directed to enter

judgment in favor of defendants and close this case. SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut this 23rd day of March, 2006.

_______/s/____________________ Donna F. Martinez United States Magistrate Judge

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