Free USCA Mandate - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

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I, U (;a§e_,§E0,3,eM,09;7Lgt/I/WE Document 109 Filed 02/03/2006 Page 1 cfm `
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( ' ‘‘“`` UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ` Al
, FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT {
` SUMMARY ORDER
I THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL I
i REPORTER AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS
OR ANY OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS
OR ANY OTHER COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A
RELATEI) CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
OR RES J UDICATA.
At a stated Temi of the United Stated Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd
day of January, two thousand and six. [
KNES COUHTg 4
Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, <` ` FILED `Y
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, S" I, _ _
1aARR1NoToN D. PARKER, JAN — 3 ZUU¤
Circuit Judges. ·t· { ‘·;
g?'m 8- MIIIKBCBBIQ l `
Cone cia¤ I ij, . U.
—-» . i e ;
Lg} -
GERTRUDE BAYONNE, I i , ;
Plaintiff—Appellant, I ` In
-v- (05—1065)
PITNEY BOWES, INC., PITNEY BOWES, INC. LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN, I
PITNEY BOWES, INC. LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN ADM and PITNEY BOWES,
INC. DISABILITY DEP’T,
Defendants-Appellees.
I
—*“‘_`”"“"“"‘—“‘”—"‘—*··*—······ I
Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellant: Mark P. Carey, Carey & Associates, Southport, CT.
Appearing for Defendants—Appellees: Nicole A. Diller, Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius LLP, San
Francisco, CA (Donald P. Sullivan, on the brief).
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, (Warren W.
Eginton, District Judge).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that thejudgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.
‘
_ISSUED AS MANDATE: [JAN 2 4 2{Ji]5 bw [
____ A I A I I "`I I _ ,___ ___, _ _ H __ , A


A Case 3:03-cv-00712-WWE Document 109 Filed 02/03/2006 Page 2 of 3 i
` Plaintiff-appellant Gertrude Bayonne ("Bayonne") appeals fiom a January 27, 2005,
decision ofthe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Eginton, ,l_,) granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Pitney Bowes, [nc., et al. ("Pitney") as to .
Bayonne’s claims for relief under ERISA §§ 502(a)(l)(B) and 502(a)(3). The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Pitney as to the first claim after determining that Pitney
did not abuse its discretion in denying Bayonne long term disability ("LTD") benefits. Because
the court fbund that denial was not wrongful, it also rejected plaintiff" s second claim that Pitney §
breached its fiduciary duty by denying benefits and thus violated § 502(a)(3). Bayonne appeals I
_ this decision. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and I
` specification of issues on appeal. _
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Trans Sport, Inc. v.
Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F .2d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 1992). In determining whether to grant
summary judgment under Fed R. Civ. P. 56, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, and we draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Ig.; Del. & Hudson Ry. I
Co. v. Consol. Rail Cogp., 902 F.2d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1990). I
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § ll32(a)(l)(B), enables a plan participant to bring suit ,
for the recovery of benefits due her under the terms of the plan. ERISA does not set out
standards c·f review for actions challenging eligibility detemrinations, so courts have created l
standards. Zuckerbrod v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co, 78 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1996). Where a p
plan gives its administrator broad discretion to detemrine whether a plan holder is entitled to ·
payment ofbeneiits, as is clearly the situation with the instant case, a court may reverse the \
administrator 's decision only if it is arbitrary or capricious. Q. We review dc novo, however, a {
district court 's decision that a plan administrator has not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in j
· denying benefits. I_gl_. A denial of a claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § i
1 l32(a)(1)(`B), is arbitrary and capricious if the decision is unreasonable or unsupported by
substantial evidence such that it constitutes a clear error of judgment. Zuckerbrod, 78 F.3d at 49.
Substantial evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. Q.
This evidence may include medical documentation. E Black & Decker Disability Plan
v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 833 (2003). In evaluating this evidence, plan administrators need not
accord special weight to the plan participant’s treating physicians. Q. at 834. Of course, they E
may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, which may include opinions l
from treating physicians, but this need not carry any special weight relative to the opinions of
other doctors. Id. Additionally, courts may not impose on plan administrators the burden of
explaining their reasons for crediting reliable evidence that happens to conflict with evidence that
the claimant has submitted. Q. I
On de novo review, we conclude that the plan administrator did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously. The administrative record contains sufficient evidence to support the
administrator’s conclusion that Bayonne is not "totally disabled" within the Plan’s definition of {
the term because she was capable of performing her tasks as a cashier. This is true even [
assuming that she had actually experienced all of the symptoms that she reported. Therefore, the
decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence. i
2 l

Case 3:03-cv-00712-WWE Document 109 Filed 02/03/2006 Page 3 of 3 N
( In her brief; Bayonne also challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of Pitney for her ERISA § 502(a)(3) claim. _S_e_g Bayorme’s br. at 43. i
Although Bayonne seemingly conceded this claim during oral argument, we will address it in the
interest of completeness. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(3), empowers a plan
participant to bring suit to enjoin any act or practice that violates provisions of this sub-chapter or
the terms of the plan. Alternatively, a participant may obtain other appropriate equitable relief to ·
redress such violations or to enforce any provisions of this sub-chapter. Ld. Section 502(a)(3) N
acts as a safety net. Sag Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 89 (2d Cir.
. 2001). It is possible, however, that a claimant could seek relief under § 502(a)(3) even though l
I she could also seek relief under a different ERISA provision. IQ. Although this is not normally N
appropriate, a court may determine, in its discretion, that other appropriate equitable remedy is
necessary despite that a claimant has already received some remedy under a different ERISA l
section. gl. In this instance—or if a plan participant has no remedy under another ERISA
section———equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) is a viable possibility. ld.
Bayonne alleges a claim under this section for breach of fiduciary duties stemming from
Pitney’s alleged procedural violations. Specifically, Bayonne first contends that Pitney failed to l
‘ afford her a full and fair review of her LTD claim by failing to give her notice of the grounds for
denying her claim. Bayonne correctly notes that the purpose behind this notice requirement is to
ensure that claimant’s have enough information so that they may adequately prepare for their N
appeal. Qliano v. Health Maint. Org., 221 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2000). Secondly, Bayonne N
claims that in committing procedural violations, Pitney violated its fiduciary duties by failing to `
discharge its duties with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence that ERISA requires. Bayonne is N
again correct that ERISA fiduciaries possess these duties. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F,2d 263, I
271 (2d Cir. 1982). Fiduciaries also have a duty not to make misrepresentations or omissions.
‘ Sep Pocchia v. NYNEX Com., 81 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 1996). N
Bayonne’s claim for equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) must fail. First, it is unlikely that E
Pitney committed any procedural notice violations that would properly support this claim. Upon N
review of Bayonne’s remaining contentions, we find no violation of Pitney’s obligations under N
the Plan sufficient to support Bayonne’s claim for equitable relief
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District Court is hereby N
AFFIRMED. I
I
FOR THE COURT:
Roseau ll. MacKechni · Clerk of Court N
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