Free Motion in Limine - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

I Case 3:00-cv—OOO52-BNC Document 153 Filed 06/24/2005 Page 1 of 3
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ____MM * I ··I. Qi
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT f` g I
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I MARGARET COWAN, I 3
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as Admrnrstratrrx of the #— J ·»»-sir.
I Estate of Victoria Cooper,
Plaintiff,

V. : CIVIL NO.: 3:00C\/'00052(RNC)
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MICHAEL BREEN, :
Defendant.

MARGARET COWAN, I
as Administratrix of the I
Estate of Victoria Cooper,
Plaintiff,
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V. : CIVIL NO.: 30lC\/00229(RNC)
TOWN OF NORTH BRANFORD : JUNE 24, 2005
Defendant.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE RE CONQUCT OF STEPHEN GUERETTE
Plaintiff moves in limine pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402 and 403 to exclude evidence
I of the events preceding the moments before the shooting. All the evidence of defendant Breen’s i
conduct, andthe conduct of Ms. Cooper and Mr. Guerette, is irrelevant other than to establish the i
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fact that Ms. Cooper was not free to leave the scene and is highly prejudicial. The evidence is
irrelevant because it does not tend to make it more probable that a reasonable police officer I
would believe that Ms. Cooper was attempting to run Breen over rather than to drive away from
I the scene. It is highly prejudicial because it involves suspected and actual unlawful conduct that I
was disrespectful of the authority of the defendant police officer.
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I
y In support of this motion, plaintiff represents as follows: X
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I Case 3:03-cv—OQO5i~F*>NC Document 153 Filed 06/%¢l€O05W;·_.lPage 2 of 3
W pl Plaintiff does not contest that a reasonable person in Ms. Co0per’s position would
appreciate that she was not free to leave the scene. Plaintiffs expert James Fyfe so testified at his
il deposition. But as between leaving the scene and running the officer over, there is nothing in the
events preceding the shooting that would make a reasonable officer believe that running over the
officer was more likely. On the contrary, after peacefully getting out of the car in compliance
l with the defendant’s order, Guerette did not assault defendant Breen but instead ran away from
him. His conduct would tend to show that Ms. Cooper would also leave the scene but not that she
l would assault Breen. Any reasonable officer would believe that Guerette and Vicki Cooper knew
that the police were certain to have the license number of the car and were aware that the officer
in all probabilitylhad called in his activity. A reasonable officer would also have to be aware of
the fact that both Guerette and Ms. Cooper knew that there was only one officer at the scene and
that escape would therefore be easier by far than running over an officer on foot in the roadway. E
p There is nothing in any of this that would support an inference in the mind of a reasonable
it officer that assault was more likely than flight. Because of this and because the evidence is so l
A i prejudicial, it should be excluded.
P I
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. Case 3:00-cv-OOO53=RNC Document 153 Filed 06/246005_ i__, Page 3 of 3
i it THE PLAINTIFF
By /s/ David N. Rosen
David N. Rosen
400 Orange Street
i New Haven, Connecticut 0651 1
1 (203) 787-3513
P CT00l96
y E-mail: [email protected]
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Memorandum was emailed on June 23, 2005 E
f and then hand-delivered on June 24, 2005 to y
t Thomas R. Gerarde, Esquire i
. Howd & Ludorf
1 65 Wethersiield Avenue
Hartford, Connecticut 06114 F
OS€1'l I
David N. Rosen . 1
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