Free Motion for Reconsideration - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

l ”"
l · Case 3:00-cv-00656-SRU Document 70 Filed O1/12/2004 Page 1 of 3 J
l ( l
( UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F I L E i
. DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT D
( l
F Zlillll JAN l2 D lzlyg
( MARSHALL CHAMBERS, } U5 ms TRIO . `
· · . T C 00 g` l
i VI plalntlrr § CtVlL NR. 3.00 CV 656$BHlDGEP@RT (3 r` I i
. ) i
( ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, } DATE: Monday, 12 January 2004 L
. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs } i
Defendant }
PLAlNTlFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER NUNC PRO TUNC (
1. Marshall Chambers, hereinafter called "Plaintiff,” hereby moves this Court, Nunc Pro Tuno, to
reconsider its decision granting Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs retaliation claim(s) with
respect to above-captioned matter. In support of this Motion, Plaintiff represents the following: 1
A. Section 704(a) of Title Vll prohibits an employer from discriminating “[A]gainst any of his N
employees because [the employee] has opposed any practice made unlawful by this 1
subchapter." 42 USC. 2000e-3(cr). I
B. To prove a prima facie case under Section 704, plaintiff must establish (1) There was a t
statutorily protected participation; (2) An adverse employment action occurred; and (3) There i
was a causal link between the participation and the adverse employment action(s). Vllhatley v.
Metro. Atlanta Transit Authority, 632 E 2d 1325, 1328, 24 FEP 1148, 1150 (5*. Cir. %
1980).
l
C. The standards for a prima facie case of retaliation are thus that the "plaintiff must show
participation in protected activity known to the defendant, an employment action (
disadvantaging the person engaged in the protected activity, and a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action." ld.; Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d
203, 207 (2d Cir.1991) The necessary causal connection may be established "either i
'indirectly by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory
treatment or directly through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against a plaintiff by the
defendant.' " Johnson, at 207 (citing DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 821 (
F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 455 (1987)). On pretext and retaliation,
1
--, I L, ........
**`T -~————»` 2- J L- A ........

i , 1 “
N Case 3:00-cv-00656-SRU Document 70 Filed O1/12/2004 Page 2 of 3
N r
N see also White v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Civil Action No.02-2364, April 22, 2003, 257 F.
{ Supp.2d 804 (Exhibit G) and Brown v Prudential Bache Securities, 1992 WL 350792
N (S.D.N.Y.)
N D. Retaliatory discharge claims are subject to the same shifting burden analysis as disparate N
N treatment claims. Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The burden
, then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. lf N
N defendant meets this burden, plaintiff must then show that the reasons advanced by are l
N pretextual. Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 64-65 (2d N
. Cir.1992). N
E. Plaintiff, ln this case, tiled three legitimate EEO complaints, which the defendant failed, or 1
refused, to investigate in a timely manner in violation of 29 C.F.R 1614. Each complaint, and N
the issues raised therein, resulted in disciplinary action ofthe Plaintiff by the Defendant.
F. Although this Court states that Plaintiff establishes Prima Facie case, it does notfnd a "causal N
` Iink," because it is unclear exactly when Plaintiffs supervisors were notified of Plaintiffs filing
the EEO Complaint (i.e., his engagement in federally protected activity). Based on the theory Z
of respondeaf superior, however, Defendant (Department of VA) knew or should reasonably N
have known of the pending Hling. It is therefore immaterial when plaintiffs supervisors knew of N
the plaintiffs EEO complaint. Sufncient basis that any adverse action thereafter should sufnce N
to support causal nexus to support engaging activity and Plaintiffs claim for retaliation. l
Once EEO Counselor (Edgar Colon) informed supervisor(s) of pending charge, any actionts) N
taken by Plaintiffs supervisor(s) after such fact indicates, clearly, retaliatory intentions.
G. ln particular, this Court is requested to reconsider its ruling with respect to each of the
following matters, set forth in Plaintiffs “Substitute Memorandum of Law in Support of
Opposition To Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment" dated March 27, 2003.
Specifically, this Court is requested to reconsider its granting summaryjudgment as to each of
the following of the Plaintiffs claims of Defendants: l
(1) Verbal Counseling of Plaintiff (Plaintiffs Substitute Memo at 33 and 43);
(2) Written Counseling of Plaintiff (Plaintiffs Substitute Memo at 35-37);
2 i

{ Case 3:00-cv-00656-SRU Document 70 Filed O1/12/2004 Page 3 of 3
l l
N (3) Formal Counseling of Plaintiff (Plaintiffs Substitute Memo at 33 and 43);
l (4) Admonishment of Plaintiff (Plaintiffs Substitute Memo at 37);
(5) Suspension of Plaintiff (Plaintiffs Substitute Memo at 39);
i (6) Removal of Plaintiffs VA Preference Points (Plaintiffs Substitute Memo at 32 and 49); and I
i (7) Denial of Plaintiffs request of Flexible Workplace Program (Plaintiffs Substitute Memo at 47).
H. Plaintiff Chambers meets all the requirements to establish retaliatory discharge. It is
I undisputed that plaintiff complained to the defendant about what he believed to be a \
discriminatory practice and was subjected to a host of various disciplinary actions and
eventually discharged after making his first complaint. l
2. Conclusion. Issues critical to the disposition of Plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claims thus
remain in dispute. Plaintiff presents issues of fact that normally preclude summaryjudgment.
Plaintiff therefore requests that this Court reconsider its decision and deny the Defendant’s motion i
for summaryjudgment as to each issue of retaliation claimed by Plaintiff..
THE PLAINTQFF,
MARS L ’ I-rAlv1BERs ? 1
BY ¢?·! [5, é‘YM ` vc.,
CA B lvl. PILGRINI, Esq., I-IIS ATTORNEY I
LAW F OALEB lvl. PILGRIM, LLC. I
1404 WI-IALLEY AVENUE (2¤ FLOOR) |
NEW HAVEN CT 06515 I
FED. BAR NO. CT 14857 l
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid,_ this Q day of January
gpg to Attorney Lauren Nash, Ass’t U.S. Attorney,}J.S. Department of Justice, 157 Church Street,
New Haven CT 00510.
qw:. rmi `rr.
CAL . IGRIM, Esq. I
l
I
I
l
3
l