Free Order on Motion for Reconsideration - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1 :06-cv-00001-GIVIS Document 68 Filed 04/10/2007 Page 1 of 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JAMES W. RILEY, )
Plaintiff, )
v. g C.A. N0. 06-Ol-GMS
STANLEY TAYLOR, et al., )
)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
I. Introduction
The plaintiff, James W. Riley ("Riley"), is an inmate housed at the Delaware Correctional
Center ("DCC"). Riley filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (i.e., rectal dysfunction, need for eyeglasses,
orthopedic footwear, skin infection). (D.I. 2.) On October 27, 2006, the court denied a request
for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order filed by Riley. (D.I. 41) Now
before the court is Riley’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s denial of the motion for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order and a motion to compel ruling on the
motion for reconsideration filed. (D.I. 45, 51.)
II. Standard of Review
Riley does not indicate if he moves for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or
60(b). Rule 60(b) motions and motions for reconsideration imder Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) serve a
similar function, but each has a distinct purpose. See United States v. F iorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288
(3d Cir. 2003). Rule 60(b) lists several grounds for reconsideration, and those grounds include
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Rule 59(e), "is a device to relitigate the

Case 1:06-cv—00001-Gl\/IS Document 68 Filed 04/10/2007 Page 2 of 4
original issue decided by the district court, and [it is] used to allege legal error." Id. (intemal
quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the motion it is clear that Riley attempts to relitigate the
issues decided in the order, and therefore, the court will construe the motion as one under Rule
59(e).
The standard for obtaining relief under Rule 59(e) is difficult for Riley to meet. The
purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). A
motion for reconsideration may be granted if the moving party shows: (1) an intervening change
in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice. Ma.x's Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). A motion for
reconsideration is not properly grounded on a request that a court rethink a decision already
made. See Glendora Energy Co. v. Borough ofGlendon, 836 F.Supp. 1109, 1122 (E. D. Pa.
1993). Motions for reargument or reconsideration may not be used "as a means to argue new
facts or issues that inexcusably were not presented to the court in the matter previously decided."
Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239, 1240 (D. Del. 1990). Reargument, however,
may be appropriate where "the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision
outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of
reasoning but of apprehension." Brambles USA, 735 F. Supp. at 1241 (D. Del. 1990) (citations
omitted); See also D. Del. LR 7.1.5.
III. Discussion
Riley argues that the court’s October 27, 2006 memorandum and order is contrary to the
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principles of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-105 (1976), and its progeny. He does not agree
with the court’s ruling and posits that the court is "not being a disinterested party." (D.I. 45.)
Riley takes exception to the court’s denial of injunctive relief, finding it contradictory because
the court ordered the defendants to advise the court of the status of specific medical complaints
made by Riley. He also contends that the court was incorrect in finding that Riley was medically
examined. Riley’s position is that, he was not seen or examined by a “qualified doctor."
Riley carmot escape the fact that he did not meet the requisites for injunctive relief
Accordingly, there is no need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice. Moreover, he has not demonstrated any of the grounds necessary to warrant
reconsideration and, therefore, the motion will be denied as to the October 27, 2006 order.
Riley also seeks reconsideration of an October 3, 2006 order dismissing the case against
defendant Amy Munson ("Munson"). The court dismissed Munson from the case on the basis
that Riley failed to show cause for his failure to timely serve her. See D.I. 37.
It appears that the court’s order and Riley’s response to a show cause order "crossed" in
the mail. Riley did not file a separate response, but instead placed the "good cause" response
within a motion to stay all proceedings. See D.I. 38. Riley states that "good cause" is shown in
his motion for injunctive relief for the failure to serve because Munson violated his Eighth
Amendment right to basic medical treatment. He then states, "[t]hus the court shall simply
compel the Attorney General Office and defendant Commissioner Taylor . . . to provide the U.S.
Marshal Office with Ms. Munson last known private residential address to complete service of
the complaint." (D.I. 38)
Even if this information had been before the court at the time it issued its order, it does
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not change the court’s ruling. Riley has failed to show cause why Munson was not timely served.
At times, the court assists prisoners in effecting service. In this case, however, Riley appears to
have taken no action (i.e., discovery tools) to effect the seryice of Munson, but rather, relies upon
the allegations in the complaint, and demands that the court take action to obtain the appropriate
information. Riley has not demonstrated any of the grounds necessary to warrant reconsideration
and, therefore, the motion will be denied as to the October 3, 2006 order.
IV. Conclusion
. rh
NOW THEREFORE, at Wilmington this 1 day of Z fi l , 2007, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
l. The motion for reconsideration of court’s denial of plaintiffs motion for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (D.I. 45) is DENIED.
2. The motion to compel ruling on plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of court’s
decision denying plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
(D.I. 51) is DENIED.
F I L E D
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